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Abstract 
 
While growing fiscal pressures and increasing life expectancy have prompted calls to raise 
retirement ages so that lifetime benefits would be concentrated in older ages, some fear that this 
change—without other adjustments—might harm long-career, lower-wage workers. Tying 
retirement benefit eligibility to years of service might protect lower-wage workers if they tend to 
start their careers relatively early and work more years prior to retirement than higher-wage 
workers. But higher disability rates and greater employment volatility could offset lower-wage 
workers’ early labor force starts, and lead to fewer total years of service completed. Using survey 
data matched to administrative earnings records, we describe variation in work histories for 
current and near retirees by gender, education, and other important characteristics. We find that 
years of service are not likely to provide an effective way to protect the lowest-wage workers. 
Among other reasons, men and women with the least education also work the least.  
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Executive Summary 
 
Many argue that growing fiscal pressures and increasing life expectancy require an increase in 
retirement ages to concentrate benefits more on older ages. Some suggest, however, that if other 
adjustments are not made, an increase in retirement ages might harm long-career, lower-wage 
workers. Tying retirement benefit eligibility to years of service is offered as one possible 
solution: it might protect lower-wage workers if they start their careers earlier and work more 
years by time of retirement than higher-wage workers. It may be ineffective, however, if higher 
disability rates and greater employment volatility among low-wage workers offset early labor 
force starts. Using Survey of Income and Program Participation data matched to administrative 
earnings and benefit receipt records, we describe variation in work histories for current and near 
retirees by gender, education, and other important characteristics. We compare segments of these 
workers’ career paths with younger workers’ to draw implications for a range of future Social 
Security policies, in particular, retirement ages.  
We find that career paths are changing significantly—and in different ways for different 
parts of the population—over time. For women, work history is increasing rapidly, with more 
educated women demonstrating the strongest average work histories. For men, work histories are 
more similar by education; still, men with less than a high school education on average work 
less—not more—than other men by middle and pre-retirement age. Some patterns are similar for 
men and women. In both cases, those whose best earnings years over their careers were less than 
the national average typically do not have high numbers of service years. These findings suggest 
that using years-of-service-based retirement ages would not disproportionately benefit the most 
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vulnerable workers. At the same time, they suggest that tying minimum benefit policies to a high 
service-year requirement might reduce those minimum benefits’ ability to reach some of those 
with the greatest need. 
A finding for the “average” for any group of people tells only part of the story. Work 
experience differs both within and across groups in myriad ways. For example, while less- 
educated men work significantly fewer years on average than more-educated men, the majority 
of men without a high school diploma still work many years under Social Security definitions. 
So while service year provisions would not be progressive overall, they could benefit a 
significant number of less-educated men with long careers. An alternative adjustment, such as 
allowing all years of service to count toward higher benefits, could be a more direct way of 
addressing the issues of this type of subgroup and also of addressing the important criteria of 
fairness and good work incentives, which one ought to consider in addition to progressivity.  
The SIPP data also show that women’s work histories differ significantly from men’s. 
Career history differences by race, for example, vary by gender. Black women, for instance, 
work more over a career than do non-black women, but the situation reverses for men. Even 
though gender differences in work histories have been declining over time, women with children 
work less than other women, who in turn work less than men. This again warns that moving 
toward a years-of-service concept to define retirement benefit eligibility would not reach the 
most vulnerable workers, since women are over represented in this group. Once more, though, 
we see that all of these groups are quite diverse: for example, some women with several children 
have earnings in virtually all years. This again raises equity issues, particularly associated with 
policies like caregiver credits and current law spouse and survivor benefits. 
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Our analyses provide some additional lessons about Social Security and labor force 
policy. First, a sizable fraction of workers with low levels of education receive Disability 
Insurance benefits, so policymakers concerned with this group need to be mindful of how any 
proposals interact with DI and related safety-net programs. Second, lifetime employment 
patterns are changing fairly rapidly across cohorts. Policies that might maximize equity for near 
retirees today may be less appropriate for later cohorts. Third, we show that the precise definition 
of a work year can matter greatly for designing policies based on work years. This underscores 
the importance of details when designing changes to Social Security. Finally, a single policy 
option—no matter how carefully detailed—often needs to be considered as part of a larger 
package of changes. Packages can offer greater opportunity to build in offsetting adjustments in 
order better to reconcile competing objectives. 
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Introduction 
Recent debates about raising the Social Security and Medicare retirement ages have generated 
considerable controversy in part because we do not have a full understanding of how the change 
would affect workers with different career paths. Some argue that increasing the retirement age 
would harm lower-wage workers who put in long careers and are more likely to need benefits at 
age 62 because of health problems or unemployment. They suggest tying benefit eligibility to 
years of service as opposed to or in addition to raising the minimum retirement age.1 The 
argument is that lower-wage workers start their careers earlier than higher-wage workers and 
thus would qualify for Social Security sooner. Among the many issues raised by these proposals 
are whether lower-wage workers with limited education in fact do accumulate more work years 
by their late 50s and early 60s than better-educated, higher-wage workers. Or do higher disability 
rates and greater employment volatility among workers with limited education offset their early 
start in the labor force? 
This project attempts to fill this gap in our knowledge by using administrative earnings 
data matched to the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to describe the work 
histories of current and near retirees and compare those histories to trajectories for younger 
workers. The analysis of older adults’ earnings histories highlights differences by key 
socioeconomic characteristics (gender, education, highest earnings, nativity, race, and 
childbearing histories). The comparisons of career earnings paths between the younger and older 
                                                 
1Variable retirement ages are used in other countries, and recent reforms in Greece and Portugal (sometimes 
promoted by organized labor) called for “flexible” retirement ages. Early work on these types of issues in the U.S. 
context included Thompson et al. (1976). Recent comments on the issue included White (2006).  This approach 
might be used to make an increase in the age at which workers can first collect Social Security retirement benefits 
more palatable (for example, the age would increase for all except those who had a met a minimum service years 
target by that age). 
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cohorts, in turn, tell us whether these differences are likely to continue into the future. Some of 
the core questions that we consider include the following: 
• How do career start dates, end dates, and years of service interact for individuals 
with different degrees of education or average earnings?  
• How does the disability insurance (DI) program interact with early endings in 
determining length of the work career, especially among those with less 
education? 
• How do the patterns of work effort by educational status differ for women and 
men, and how does caregiving influence these patterns?  
We begin by describing previous research on career paths. We then outline some Social 
Security policy areas that are quite sensitive to work years. While we primarily focus on 
retirement ages based on years of service, we also consider implications for other policies such 
as caregiver credits, computation years, and minimum benefits. Turning next to data sources and 
methods, we place particular emphasis on data quality and measurement issues associated with 
the matched survey data. We then present our results, a series of descriptive estimates from the 
historical data. We close with observations on how policymakers should take into account 
patterns in work years when designing changes to the Old Age, Survivors and Disability 
Insurance program (OASDI).2 
We find that patterns in work histories appear to be changing quite rapidly across cohorts. 
Certain subgroups of less-educated men (most notably high school graduates) do complete many 
                                                 
2 We use the terms OASDI and Social Security interchangeably. 
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years of service early, especially relative to men with more than a college degree. Generally, 
however, different levels of education do not markedly differentiate the number of years of 
service among men except that those with less than a high school diploma tend to work less than 
other men at young ages, especially in later cohorts. In both earlier and later cohorts, women’s 
work patterns tend to rise with education. Those with more than college work the most and those 
with some college come in second. These patterns persist even after accounting for immigration, 
earnings not covered by the Social Security program, and receipt of disability program benefits. 
These results suggest that years-of-service provisions will not effectively offset an increase in the 
retirement age for many of the least educated, lower-wage workers. Nonetheless, some other 
policy options based on career length could help a significant minority, especially men with a 
high school diploma or less with long work careers.  
Previous Research and Contribution to the Literature 
Despite their importance to retirement income security, surprisingly little is known about career 
earnings history patterns. Even though the issue is quite straightforward, data limitations have 
until recently prevented a thorough accounting of lifetime work patterns.  
Most surveys are too short to measure lifetime earnings. The National Longitudinal 
Studies (NLS) focus on individuals in particular age ranges (e.g., youth, young women, young 
men, mature women, mature men), facilitating analyses of fairly long-term earnings, but only for 
a subset of the life course. Veum and Weiss (1993), for example, use the 1979 youth survey 
(NLSY) to describe early career experience (from ages 18 through 27) by sex and race, and find 
that many observed differences in work experience by race and sex become smaller or disappear 
once they account for education. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has followed 
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respondents for many years (since 1968), but only now are any survey respondents approaching 
a full career. Attrition and inadequate treatment of immigrants also raise questions about the 
sample’s representativeness.3  
Several studies use retrospective data to examine the related concept of job tenure and 
consider whether it has been changing in recent decades. Although tenure does not directly 
correspond to Social Security service years, the concepts are related because the program covers 
most U.S. jobs, and long job tenures imply lack of movement out of the workforce during those 
years. Stevens (2004), for example, considers self-reported completed tenure on the longest job 
using data from several longitudinal sources (the Retirement History Survey, the NLS of Older 
Men, and the Health and Retirement Study). She finds little evidence of declining long-term 
tenure for late career men. Farber (2007, forthcoming) uses Current Population Survey data 
(including those from supplements) from 1973 to 2005. He finds men’s age-specific tenure 
declines over the period, while women’s appears more stable. One limitation of these studies is 
that retrospective data tend to have inaccuracies, with respondents often rounding their answers 
to five- and ten-year intervals, for example. 
Administrative data on work and earnings avoid some of these limitations of survey data. 
A major advantage is their relative accuracy. Reporting error is known to be considerable in self-
reported earnings (e.g., Cristia and Schwabish 2007; Pischke 1995). Survey respondents often 
systematically underreport earnings, with reporting error negatively correlated with actual 
earnings. A limitation of administrative data is that they usually lack substantial demographic 
information. However, by matching administrative data to survey records, researchers can 
                                                 
3 Validation studies of the PSID are numerous, and include Becketti et al. (1988) and Fitzgerald et al. (1998). 
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combine information on a vast array of demographic characteristics, often including life histories 
(marriage and fertility histories, for example), with high-quality earnings and benefit receipt 
information. 
Iams (1991) relies on the 1984 SIPP matched to administrative earnings and benefit data 
and focused on exits from the labor force for caregiving for members of the 1930 to 1949 birth 
cohorts. Haverstick et al. (2007) use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) linked to 
administrative earnings records to explore related questions, with a particular focus on how to 
mitigate adverse effects of an increase in the Social Security early eligibility age on older 
workers with work limitations. They find that tying benefit claiming to years of service (and 
counting caregiving toward service years) would typically not be very helpful to workers who 
approach retirement in poor health.  
Researchers have begun using administrative data on earnings—including the Continuous 
Work History Supplement (CWHS) and various matched files—for a variety of related 
applications, including examining income distribution, intragenerational mobility, and earnings 
volatility.4 Researchers from the Congressional Budget Office (2007) examine earnings volatility 
using data from CWHS, which they supplement with self-reports in SIPP. They conclude that 
year-to-year earnings volatility is substantial and arises from both voluntary choices and 
involuntary events, and that declines in macroeconomic volatility do not appear to have reduced 
volatility for workers. Importantly for this study, they also find that less educated workers have 
more earnings volatility than those with more education. These findings are consistent with other 
                                                 
4 For example, Haider and Solon (2006) use the matched HRS data to explore the relationship between current and 
lifetime earnings. Utendorf (2001/2002) uses CWHS data from 1982 to 1994 to consider trends in earnings 
inequality. Kopczuk, Saez, and Song (2007) use Master Earnings file data (not linked to surveys) to characterize 
inequality and mobility since 1937.   
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work that finds longer unemployment spells for those with less education (for example, 
Gottschalck 2006). 
Extending this previous work, our study looks at education-specific labor force patterns 
and considers labor force interruptions for child care and other reasons (e.g., disability). We do 
not look at job tenure (i.e., time working for a particular employer) or job transitions per se, but 
rather focus strictly on earnings histories (whether one had earnings above a threshold, regardless 
of whether these earnings were with a series of employers).5 
A particularly important contribution of this project is the cross-cohort comparisons. 
Recent research into low employment rates by men who did not complete high school (especially 
African Americans) underscores the importance of recent changes in career patterns (Edelman et 
al. 2006). At the same time, women of all education levels with young children are more likely to 
be working now than in the past, even if they are unmarried (Johnson et al. 2003; U.S. 
Department of Labor 2006). This suggests that combining information on different cohorts may 
be the best way to explore the persistence of career paths, and how it differs for men and women 
(Hungerford 2004). Policies that fail to account for these cohort changes may not achieve their 
intended effects. 
Social Security Law and Policy Relevance 
Future Social Security changes are likely to address its long-run fiscal deficit (OASDI Trustees 
2007). Along the way, however, many proposals attempt to improve the program’s adequacy, 
efficiency, or equity. Unfortunately, though, few policy prescriptions make improvements along 
                                                 
5 The administrative data do not have consistent information on wage rates or hours worked, only on annual earnings 
(self-reports can supplement in those years where self-reports are available). 
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all of these lines simultaneously, partly because these objectives often conflict. Trade-offs are 
often required when addressing simultaneously (1) fiscal balance, (2) fairness (i.e., treating 
similarly beneficiaries who have worked the same amount), (3) work incentives, and (4) 
adequacy for the most vulnerable beneficiaries.  
Under a number of Social Security reform options geared at improving program 
performance along one or more of these four objectives, outcomes are quite sensitive to the 
character of workers’ career paths. Such policies include alternative retirement ages, minimum 
benefits, and changes in the years counted for benefits (the current system uses an Average 
Indexed Monthly Earnings [AIME] with a limited computation period of 35 years).6  
Retirement Ages: Changing the Social Security retirement age is a hot-button political 
issue. While there are several indications that such changes are politically unpopular, many 
policy analysts see merit in increasing the retirement age. Americans are living longer: since 
1940 (not long after Social Security first started paying benefits), life expectancy at age 65 has 
increased by about four and one-half years for men and more than five and one-half years for 
women (Board of Trustees 2007). At the same time, many jobs are becoming less physically 
demanding, allowing older adults to remain in the labor force longer (Johnson 2004; Johnson et 
al. 2007). And, until recently, over the course of Social Security, people have been retiring even 
earlier while living longer. One can thus consider this issue as separable from whether total 
benefits increase or decrease under some reform.  
                                                 
6 AIME is defined as the average of one’s highest years of indexed, Social Security earnings (e.g., covered earnings 
up to the taxable maximum), where earnings are indexed to the earlier of the year that one turns age 60 or two years 
before one becomes disabled or dies. AIME is used to compute the base benefit amount for workers (Primary 
Insurance Amount, or PIA). For details on AIME and PIA computations, see Social Security Administration (2007). 
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Retirement age increases could allow the system to adjust to increased longevity (and, 
indeed, some analysts explicitly call for longevity indexing). Retirement ages are also important 
because they trigger incentives (like actuarial reductions for early retirement or credits for 
delayed retirement), and can send strong social signals about the appropriate time to retire and 
societal expectations for work and leisure in later life.7 Without retirement age increases, 
individuals likely will continue to respond to this signal spending ever increasing fractions of 
their adulthoods collecting public pension and health benefits. Early retirement in turn limits 
retirement incomes by spreading their benefits and other savings over more years and can strap 
younger generations with very high tax burdens to finance these benefits (see, for example, 
Shoven 2007). Furthermore, policies that discourage work or saving have additional costs--such 
as reductions in revenues to support the system--thus reducing the size of the average lifetime 
benefit that any given tax rate can afford.  
Social Security has two key retirement ages. The early eligibility age (EEA) is the age at 
which an individual can first collect retired worker benefits, although at a reduced level. The 
normal (or full) retirement age (NRA) is the age at which an individual can collect unreduced 
benefits. Social Security’s EEA is now set at age 62. The NRA has increased from age 65 (for 
those born 1937 and earlier) to 66 for those retiring this year, and will be 67 for those reaching 
age 62 in 2022 and later (born 1960 and later).  
Under Social Security, retirement ages are fixed for every cohort, regardless of when 
people enter the labor force, a design feature that raises distributional concerns. Those who start  
                                                 
7 Retirement ages that are too low, for example, could lead individuals who are not forward-thinking to leave the 
labor force earlier than they should to finance a comfortable retirement (i.e., before they have adequate savings), 
leaving them vulnerable to poverty later in life.  
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their careers early (such as those who forego educational opportunities in order to help support 
their family) may end up working many years at arduous jobs and find that they are “worn out” 
when they reach their early 60s.8 A 2002 RAND study (Panis et al. 2002) suggests that between 
5 and 20 percent of early Social Security claimants could be vulnerable to retirement age 
increases, and research on hiring discrimination against older workers suggests that women may 
have difficulty finding employment in later life (Lahey 2006). 
Social Security’s disability programs—DI and the means-tested Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) program—may meet the needs of many people physically incapable of working at 
older ages.9 Indeed, nearly 13 percent of men in their early sixties receive DI benefits. Fractions 
for women are a bit lower (about 10 percent), but rising as women work more and qualify for DI 
benefits. The difference in disability rates by education level is striking, with those with less 
education receiving DI and SSI disability benefits at much higher rates than those with more 
education (Table 1). For example, DI/SSI receipt rates are about eight times higher for women 
who are high school dropouts than for those with graduate school training, and around 30 percent 
of men who did not complete high school receive some disability benefits in their late 50s and 
early 60s. This differential suggests that the DI and SSI programs may address some of the needs 
of less-educated workers that are related to their limited physical capacity to continue to work 
(but not necessarily the issue of how to provide equity for those with long careers in the 
                                                 
8 Many of these same concerns arise with those in their 50s, as well. Health issues do not suddenly arise at any 
particular age. (For data on age gradients in self-reported health status, see for example Table 60, NCHS 2007) 
9 The DI program and disability component of SSI have strict tests, requiring workers to document inability to 
engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment expected to 
end in death or to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. (The DI program also tests for recency of work, 
underlining the program’s motivation to replace lost income for regular, not intermittent, workers.) 
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Table 1. Percent of Adults Ages 51-64 Currently Receiving DI or SSI Benefits  
by Sex and Education, 2004 
 
 Men Women 
   
Less than high school 30.5 28.0 
High school  12.5 11.0 
Some college 9.3 8.3 
College degree 4.0 2.9 
Post-college 1.6 3.3 
   
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to benefit (Master Beneficiary 
File/Supplemental Security Record) and mortality records (Numident). 
Notes: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to 2004. Estimates are weighted to account for SIPP’s 
oversampling of households in areas with high poverty concentrations. 
 
workforce). Significant fractions of these less-educated workers could still fall through the 
cracks because of the two programs’ strict impairment tests, SSI’s asset test, and DI’s recency of 
work test (Wittenburg and Favreault 2003).  
Computation years: Social Security currently bases benefits for retired workers on the 
highest 35 years of earnings. Many have proposed increasing the computation period (to 38 or 40 
years, for example) or totally uncapping the calculation algorithm (see, for example, Aaron and 
Reischauer 1998; Advisory Council on Social Security 1994–96; Kolbe and Stenholm 2002; 
Moynihan and Kerrey 1998; National Commission on Retirement Policy 1998; Steuerle and 
Spiro 1999). A major rationale for increasing computation years (besides the fact that is one way 
for the system to save money) is to increase work incentives at older ages. Allowing those who 
work more than 35 years to earn extra benefits also can improve equity. The current system now 
provides greater benefits for someone with 30 years of service at an average (indexed) annual 
wage of $40,000 than to a person with 40 years of service at $30,000 (see Steuerle and Spiro 
1999). Goda, Shoven, and Slavov (2006) suggest some additional variations on computation 
  
11 The Retirement Policy Program 
years changes. Previous research has suggested that the impact of such reforms would differ by 
gender, race, and Hispanicity (Sandell, Iams, and Fanaras 1999).10  
Caregiver credits: Some analysts propose that years spent out of (or less engaged in) the 
labor force while providing care—whether to children or elderly relatives—should count toward 
years of service/Social Security benefits (see, for example, Hartmann and Hill 1999, Lowey 
2007). Under one proposal, the system would credit caregivers with a certain annual earnings 
level (for example, half the average wage). One argument for caregiver credits is that they would 
explicitly link benefits to care (rather than marital status, as with the spouse and survivor benefits 
current law provides). Because almost three-fifths of all women with children under age three are 
in the labor force (U.S. Department of Labor 2006), however, equity questions arise from giving 
credits only to individuals out of the labor force or working relatively few hours vis-à-vis those 
who provide care in other ways, e.g.., through more equal division of both caregiving and paid 
employment between spouses.  
Caregiver credits also raise many design issues, like what qualifies as a caregiving year 
(e.g., whether children need to be below some age, whether care to disabled elders qualifies, 
etc.), who should finance the extra benefits, and how a year of service is valued (minimum wage, 
half the average wage, etc.). Analyses suggest that caregiver credits by themselves might be 
more progressive than current law spouse benefits, and could especially benefit unmarried 
mothers who get no spousal or survivor benefits (Herd 2006, forthcoming, Favreault and 
Steuerle 2007). 
                                                 
10 Based on data from the 1991 SIPP matched to SSA earnings records, the analysts estimated that women, black 
men, Hispanic women, and those with least education and lowest lifetime earnings would lose the most (in relative 
terms) with computation years increases. 
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Minimum Benefits: While the Social Security reforms just discussed primarily address 
equity and efficiency issues, minimum benefits focus on improving benefit adequacy. Minimum 
benefit proposals frequently use years of covered employment as a criterion for determining 
eligibility and benefit levels. Some recent proposals have required between 20 and 40 service 
years to qualify for a benefit, with increasing benefit levels with each service year. One core 
motivation for enhancing minimum benefits in Social Security is to increase the program’s 
adequacy for workers with low lifetime earnings, given that substantial fractions of beneficiaries, 
especially among women, are still poor or near poor (see, for example, Herd 2005). Two of the 
three plans in the Presidents’ Commission report (2001) incorporated a minimum benefit 
proposal as a backstop to risks associated with private individual, 401(k)-like accounts; however, 
the particular designs were projected to provide few benefits to people in the future because they 
required so many years of service at such high levels that in the end they were largely symbolic. 
Research suggests that design details, including required years of service, can make a big 
difference in whether a minimum benefit could alleviate poverty or low income (Favreault, 
Mermin, and Steuerle 2007).  
Data and Methods 
We use data from the 1996 SIPP matched to Social Security earnings, benefit, and mortality data 
(the Summary Earnings Records [SER], Detailed Earning File, Master Beneficiary Record, 
Supplemental Security Record, and Numident) through 2004 to describe career earnings for  
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those born from 1935 through 1970.11 Because the SER earnings start in 1951, we consider only 
people who turn age 16 (the minimum age for labor force entry, expect in exceptional 
circumstances) in 1951 or later (i.e., persons born in 1935 and later) even though SIPP includes 
people who were born earlier. Later cohorts are more informative given the rapid changes in 
work patterns across cohorts and the likelihood that most Social Security changes would 
grandfather current beneficiaries and those likely to be entitled in the near future.  
SIPP represents the non-institutional population and oversamples lower-income 
households likely to participate in transfer programs (Westat 2001).12 Individuals in the SIPP 
were first interviewed in early 1996, with follow-up interviews every four months for up to three 
and one half years. We compare segments of older workers’ career paths with younger workers’ 
paths to draw implications for the future.13 Table 2 presents select descriptive statistics for the 
SIPP sample, contrasting those who reached age 55 or higher by 2004 (the focus of many 
analyses) with the larger sample (including younger individuals who are just 34 that year).  
Our analysis tabulates years of OASDI-covered service, and shows how they vary by age, 
gender, earnings, education, and other important socioeconomic and demographic characteristics 
(childbearing histories, race, etc.). In sensitivity analyses, we consider the effect of different  
                                                 
11 We chose the 1996 SIPP panel over more recent panels (e.g., the 2001 SIPP) because of its much higher match 
rate to the administrative earnings data. Matched Current Population Survey data, another option, do not contain as 
much information about marriage and fertility histories as SIPP. We chose 1970 as the latest birth cohort to 
examine, as people in this cohort had reached age 28 in 1996 (and age 32 by the end of the SIPP panel), points at 
which we would have reasonably good estimates of their ultimate educational attainment. In an earlier version of 
this paper, we also included matched data from the Health and Retirement Study as a counterpoint to the SIPP data. 
We ultimately chose to rely on the SIPP alone because of the significantly higher match rate and larger sample size 
(using a person framework).  
12 Because of this oversampling, we use weights in all descriptive analyses. 
13 Such comparisons complicate the analyses, as the populations differ in their survival experiences.  
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 Table 2. Characteristics of the SIPP Sample, by Birth Cohort 
 
  Birth cohort 
  1935-1947 1935-1970 
    
Percent with any SER match 86.6 85.5 
Mean characteristics (Percent)   
 Female  51.6  52.4  
 Less than high school 18.1 13.3 
 High school graduate 32.2 31.0 
 Some college 25.9 30.2 
 College graduate 13.3 17.3 
 Post college 10.5 8.1 
 Number of children 2.4 1.8 
 Foreign born 9.7 9.8  
 Long-term uncovered worker  6.0 4.3 
 Health is fair or poor 20.08 11.7 
 Health status is missing 0.2 0.3 
    
N (before SER restriction) 10,571 41,725 
N (with SER match, no missing data on key 
variables) 
9,200 40,352 
    
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records. 
Notes: Percents may not add to 100 due to rounding. Long-term uncovered workers are defined as those with five or more years 
in which all earnings were in a job not covered by Social Security. Estimates are weighted to account for SIPP’s oversampling of 
households in areas with high poverty concentrations. 
 
definitions of service years (e.g., four covered quarters compared to a minimum of half-time, 
half-year work at the minimum wage). We consider persons who have received DI (or SSI) 
benefits separately from those who have not to assess how well SSA disability programs protect 
long-career, low-wage workers reaching later life with physical or mental limitations  
Social Security does not cover all workers in the U.S. economy, and Social Security 
coverage has increased substantially over time—from 82.5 percent of civilian workers in 1955 to 
about 96.0 percent today (Committee on Ways and Means 2004).14 To avoid confounding 
                                                 
14 Federal employees hired prior to 1984, many state and local employees, and certain students do not pay OASDI 
payroll taxes, and their earnings do not count toward OASDI insured status or benefits. Individuals in uncovered 
employment differ from workers in the economy at large along a number of dimensions (for example, in recent 
years, uncovered workers have been disproportionately female), and the earnings of uncovered workers differ from 
the overall earnings distribution (Kawachi et al. 2007). 
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uncovered employment with spells out of the labor force, we exclude long-term uncovered 
workers from many tabulations and control for the number of years in uncovered employment 
plus baseline (i.e., first available) uncovered work status in the regression analyses.15 
The analyses account for several important measurement, censoring, and selection issues 
associated with these data, including incomplete matches to administrative records, survey 
attrition, and mortality. Earnings records could not be found for about 14 percent of the SIPP 
sample. We do not know how or whether these differential match rates could affect these results 
(for information on SIPP match rate differentials, see Czajka, Mabli, and Cody 2007). Also, 
some of our analyses, such as the evaluation of earnings through age 65, require special attention 
to representativeness due to factors like differential mortality by education and earnings. 
Similarly, certain race and education group comparisons at a single year of age late in life may 
relay on relatively small sample sizes. Because of these limits, our findings must be interpreted 
with caution. The appendix provides more information.  
Descriptive Results 
We begin by measuring work experience using average years of covered employment—defined 
as years of earnings greater than four OASDI covered quarters (in 2007, a quarter requires $1000 
in covered earnings)—to different ages (in 5-year steps). We choose a threshold of at least four 
                                                 
15 Detailed Earnings File (DER) data, which allow one to distinguish covered from uncovered work, are only 
available for the latter part of the period we examine (starting in about 1982). We combine SER and DER 
information to identify long-term non-covered workers. We use a threshold of five years of non-covered work from 
1982-2004 for removing uncovered workers from the tabulation samples. In the regression analyses, we use the total 
number of uncovered work years from 1982 to the specified age plus a baseline (1982) measure. 
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covered quarters of earnings rather than, say, earnings greater than zero, for consistency with 
several other Social Security program rules and definitions.16  
Birth Cohort and Gender: The SIPP data show that employment histories for women 
have increased steadily over time (Figure 1).17 (The number of individuals reflected by each data 
point differs substantially. At the first age, 30, we can represent more cohorts, while at later  
 
Figure 1. Average Covered Work Years (Defined as Earnings of at Least 4 Covered Quarters) to Selected 
Ages for Women by Selected Birth Cohorts (1935-1965) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records and Numident though 2004. 
Note: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to selected age.  
 
ages, we can only count up experiences for members of those cohorts that have reached that age 
by 2004, the last year for which we have data.) At age 30, women in the latest cohorts (from the 
                                                 
16 A covered quarter is the minimum level of earnings required to gain credit toward insured status for Social 
Security. Four covered quarters designate a year of service (though the quarters do not always have to be earned in a 
calendar year, and since 1978 do not have to been earned in different calendar quarters), the designated eligibility 
level in some minimum benefit proposals (see Favreault et al. 2007 for a sample). 
17 See, for example, DiCecio et al. (2008) for a review of explanations of the changes in women’s work. 
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late 1950s and early 1960s) had on average worked about three and one half covered years more 
than their older counterparts (the 1935 cohort) had at the same age. By age 55, this differential 
increases to about four and one half covered years between the first (1935) and last cohorts (in 
this case, the late 1940s). If we were to extend the lines for some of the younger cohorts (from 
the 1950s and early 1960s) over the next decade or so, it is not difficult to imagine this age-55 
difference increasing to seven or eight years from the earliest cohorts to the latest. The general 
pattern seems to be one of continuing increase for women born between the mid-1930s through 
about 1959, at which point age-specific cumulative covered work years roughly level off.  
For men, there is no obvious difference in work histories across the cohorts (Figure 2). 
Men in virtually all cohorts have high average lifetime participation rates, but the 1935 and 1938  
Figure 2. Average Covered Work Years (Defined as Earnings of at Least 4 Covered Quarters) to Selected 
Ages for Men by Selected Birth Cohorts (1935-1965) 
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Age
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r 
of
 c
ov
er
ed
 w
or
k 
ye
ar
s
1935
1938
1941
1944
1947
1950
1953
1956
1959
1962
1965
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records and Numident though 2004. 
Note: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to selected age.  
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cohorts bound these estimates at all ages, with a maximum difference of about two covered work 
years at any age.18  
Mean values for covered work years hide a lot of variability. A population could, for 
example, work an average of 20 years because everyone works 20 years, or because half the 
group does not work at all and the other half works every year for 40 years. To explore this sort 
of variation, we turn to distributions of work years and consider outcomes at age 60, when the 
career is substantially complete for many (Figure 3). The figure thus includes only people born 
between 1935 and 1944. This figure’s horizontal axis shows the number of covered work years, 
and the vertical axis the fraction of workers who have worked at least the given number of years.  
Figure 3. Cumulative Distribution of Covered Work Years (Defined as Earnings of at Least 4 Covered 
Quarters) for Those in the 1935-1944 Birth Cohorts Surviving to Age 60, by Sex  
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records and Numident though 2004. 
Note: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to age 60. 
                                                 
18The vertical scale differs for the women’s and men’s graphs because the men’s means are so much higher. 
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The results show that the overwhelming fraction of men has covered earnings in most 
years of adulthood up to age 60. About half have worked at least four covered quarters in 38 
years or more. The median age at which men reach 35 years of service (the current computation 
years threshold) in covered employment is 53 (author’s calculations). For women, the work years 
distribution is much flatter, displaying more significant variation. In these older cohorts, only 
about 10 percent have worked for at least four covered quarters in each of 38 years or more, 
while about 19 percent have worked fewer than ten covered years (compared to less than five 
percent among men). 
Education: We next consider patterns by educational attainment and age for average 
number of years worked in covered employment. These results exclude immigrants because the 
immigrant educational distribution differs from the distribution for native-born individuals and 
immigrants’ earnings histories are often shortened because many arrive in the U.S. as adults. 
Because (as Table 1 showed) the prevalence of disability program participation decreases 
markedly with education, we also exclude those with a history to date of benefit receipt (from 
either DI or SSI for the disabled, which impose the same medical criteria for disability, despite 
their differing resource and work experience tests). 19 The rationale is that those with limitations 
that prevent them from working should not be expected to have as lengthy careers as those 
without limitations, and Social Security has never imposed the actuarial reduction for early 
retirement for those receiving benefits from DI.20 This suggests that a service years program 
would also not be geared toward this population. We also exclude from the sample those with 
                                                 
19 We measure whether individuals have received DI or SSI through 2004. Some younger individuals in the sample 
will receive disability benefits later in their careers. 
20 We discuss incremental effects of DI beneficiary receipt in more detail below in the regression analyses. 
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long-term spells in uncovered employment, as Social Security reforms rarely focus on workers 
with substantial experience (and pension coverage) in work outside the Social Security system.21  
For women, those without a high school diploma are less likely to work than other 
women at all the ages we examine (Figure 4). 22 Women have on average worked about two and 
one quarter years fewer than the next closest group at age 25, and five and one quarter fewer 
years at age 55. Of course, these less-educated women are more likely to be in the older cohorts, 
Figure 4. Average Work Years (Defined as at Least 4 Covered Quarters) at Various Ages for Native-Born 
Women in the 1935–1970 Birth Cohorts Who Have Never Received DI or SSI and Have Not Had a Long 
Recent Spell in Uncovered Employment, by Education  
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/Master Beneficiary File/Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
Note: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to selected age. 
 
                                                 
21 Exceptions include proposals to integrate newly hired state and local workers into Social Security or changes to 
the Windfall Elimination Provision and Government Pension Offset.  
22 The 1996 SIPP data do not allow us to readily distinguish those with a General Equivalency Diploma (GED) from 
those with a more traditional high school diploma. Analyses based on the Health and Retirement Study (available 
upon request) suggest that there are significant differences in work years achieved between these groups, consistent 
with other work about the selectivity and economic outcomes of GED recipients (e.g., Cameron and Heckman 
1993). 
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so the chart to some extent reflects cohort patterns observed in the prior chart. Women with at 
least some college work a bit more on average than high school graduates at all ages after 25. At 
the older ages, the sample sizes for the more educated groups of women become relatively small. 
For men, those with less than a high school education similarly lag in covered work years 
(Figure 5). High school graduates appear to be stronger lifetime participants than those without a 
diploma or with a lot of education (most notably more than college), but relative to women there 
is greater similarity across the education groups. There is a difference of about two and one 
quarter work years at age 55 and then three and one quarter years at age 65 between those who 
did not complete high school and those with graduate school experience.  
Figure 5. Average Work Years (Defined as Earnings of at Least 4 Covered Quarters) at Various Ages for 
Native-Born Men in the 1935–1970 Birth Cohorts Who Have Never Received DI/SSI and Have Not Had a 
Long Recent Spell in Uncovered Employment, by Education 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/Master Beneficiary File/Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
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We should bear in mind that the group with less than a high school education is a far 
smaller portion of the population in the later cohorts than in the earlier cohorts, a factor that we 
explore further in the regression analyses.23 Also, corrections for mortality and disability differ 
across the estimates, and could increase the size of the difference between education groups. 
Because the least-educated individuals with the shortest work histories are also among the most 
likely to die relatively early, they may appear in the estimates at age 35, but not, say, at age 60.  
Examining the full distributions of work years at age 60 by education, we find that a 
substantial fraction of less educated workers do have long careers despite the group’s relatively 
low mean work years (Figures 6 and 7). Again, the figures exclude immigrants, individuals with 
disability benefits, and those with long-term uncovered employment. Among women in this 
cohort, only about 10 percent in the low-education (less than high school) group have worked 
more than 35 years (Figure 6). But among men, more than 62 percent of those with less than a 
high school education have worked more than 35 years, and a majority (over 52 percent) has 
worked 40 years (Figure 7). A substantial fraction—about one in eight—of the most-educated 
male workers (those with more than a college degree) have worked just 31 to 35 years, compared 
to eight percent among high school graduates. Notably, the latter is the group on the curve’s 
frontier (i.e., with the highest number of people with at least that many work years) at virtually 
all the work levels examined.  
Earnings: Education, of course, imperfectly predicts job characteristics (like how 
rewarding or physically demanding it is likely to be). To supplement the analyses of education, 
we look at relatively simple earnings measures to try to better gauge the work histories of  
                                                 
23 About 18 percent of the sample has less than a high school education in the 1935-1947 cohorts, compared to about 
13 percent in the 1935–1970 cohorts, a decline of over 25 percent. 
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Figure 6. Native-Born Women's Covered Work Years (Defined as Earnings of at Least 4 Covered Quarters) 
to Age 60, Excluding Those Who Have Received DI/SSI or Have Had a Long Recent Spell in Uncovered 
Employment, by Education (1935–1944 Birth Cohorts) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/Master Beneficiary File/Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
Note: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to age 60.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Native-Born Men's Covered Work Years (Defined as Earnings of at Least 4 Covered Quarters) to 
Age 60, Excluding Those Who Have Received DI/SSI or Have Had a Long Recent Spell in Uncovered 
Employment, by Education (1935–1944 Birth Cohorts) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records and Numident though 2004. 
Note: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to age 60. 
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economically vulnerable workers. Specifically, we consider the average of the two highest 
earnings years in any employment (both covered and uncovered employment) in the career to 
date, expressed as a percentage of the national average annual wage used for Social Security 
indexing ($38,651 in 2006).24 We cross-tabulate the work years distribution at age 60 by this 
characteristic, once more for the native-born population and excluding individuals with long-
term uncovered employment and disability program participation. 
Figures 8 and 9 show how average covered work years vary by earnings for women and 
men, respectively. For women (Figure 8), the percentage with total work years at higher levels 
increases with each increase in the maximum wage until women reach a two-year average high 
wage of about one and one quarter times the national average wage, at which point the 
distribution of years worked starts to look the same for the different earnings groups. For men 
(Figure 9), the pattern in work years by earnings is qualitatively similar, though with a different 
point at which the convergence across earnings groups occurs. Those with maximum earnings of 
one and one half times the average wage and more seem to have relatively similar work years 
distributions, while below that level lower rates of long-duration work accompany each 
reduction in earnings level. Looking at this in another way, the SIPP data suggest that only 
modest fractions of workers have long work histories at consistently low wages, even after 
accounting for disability participation. For men, only about 12 percent of those whose highest 
total earnings were between one-half and three-quarters of the average wage worked 35 or more 
years, while for women less than 5 percent of those in this earnings group reached 35 years. For 
those who earn less than half the average wage at a maximum, the fractions are even lower. 
                                                 
24 A longer measure (for example, the average of the five highest years) might better represent earnings capacity, but 
we have opted for a low bound in order to minimize the number of cases where people did not have at least this 
many years in which we can observe annual wages. 
 
  
25 The Retirement Policy Program 
Figure 8. Cumulative Covered Work Years (of at Least 4 Covered Quarters) at Age 60 for Native-Born 
Women Surviving to 60 by Maximum Total Earnings, Excluding Those Who Have Received DI/SSI and 
Those in Long-Term Uncovered Employment  
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/Master Beneficiary File/Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
Notes: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to age 60. We define maximum total earnings as the average of 
the highest two years of earnings (including uncovered earnings). Aw=National average annual wage. 
 
 
Figure 9. Cumulative Covered Work Years (of at Least 4 Covered Quarters) at Age 60 for Native-Born Men 
Surviving to 60 by Maximum Total Earnings, Excluding those Who Have Received SSI/DI and Those in 
Long-Term Uncovered Employment 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/Master Beneficiary File/Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
Notes: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to age 60. We define maximum total earnings as the average of 
the highest two years of earnings (including uncovered earnings). 
Aw=National average annual wage. 
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Number of children: Each additional child depresses women’s year of paid work in the 
1935-1947 cohorts (Figure 10). 25 The SIPP data suggest that at age 50 women without children 
worked on average about five and one-half years fewer than all men. For a woman with two 
children, the gap at age 50 (with the average man) is an additional 4.5 years (for a total of almost 
ten years). By age 60, these same gaps are 7.6 years between the woman with no children and the 
man, with an additional 4.75 years for the women with two children, for a total gap of over 12 
and one quarter years.  
Figure 10. Native-Born Women's Average Covered Work Years to Select Ages by Number of Children Ever 
Born, Excluding Those with DI or SSI Experience or Long-Term Uncovered Employment, 1935–1947 Birth 
Cohorts 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/Master Beneficiary File/Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
Note: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to selected age.  
                                                 
25 The effect’s direction is unclear: smaller family sizes may contribute to or result from women’s increased 
participation. 
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In later (1948-1958) cohorts, both the effect of children and the effect for being a woman 
on work years forms a pattern similar to earlier cohorts’, though with a reduction in absolute size 
(Figure 11).26 For instance, the gap at age 50 between the woman without children and the 
average man is now just over two years (down over three years from 5.4 years earlier), and the 
corresponding gap for women with two children is closer to 6.5 years (down about three and a 
half years from 9.9 earlier).  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Native-Born Women's Average Covered Work Years to Select Ages by Number of Children Ever 
Born, Excluding Those with DI or SSI Experience or Long-Term Uncovered Employment, 1948–1958 Birth 
Cohorts 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/Master Beneficiary File/Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
Note: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to selected age.  
 
                                                 
26 For this graph, we limit the population to individuals born between 1948 and 1958 to allow for relatively complete 
fertility histories by the end of the survey. 
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Regardless of means, small but significant minorities of women with at least one child in 
the 1935-1947 cohorts work virtually all years (Figure 12). For example, among women 
surviving to age 60, just over one-fifth of women with one child and almost 15 percent of those 
with two children had worked at least four covered quarters for more than 40 years. We expect 
that in later birth cohorts these fractions will grow considerably.  
Figure 12. Distribution of Work Years to Age 60 for Native-Born Women in the 1935–1944 Birth Cohorts  
by Number of Children, Excluding Those with DI or SSI Experience or Long-Term Uncovered Employment 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records and Numident though 2004. 
Note: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to age 60. 
 
 
Race: Labor force participation also varies by race. In the 1935-1970 cohorts, the work 
histories of native-born blacks differ from those of native-born non-blacks (Figures 13 and 14). 
(In the figures, we show the incremental effect of adding the DI/SSI restriction.) Disaggregating 
by gender, the data reveal that African-American women on average work more years in covered 
employment than other women. After accounting for differential DI/SSI receipt, African-
  
29 The Retirement Policy Program 
Figure 13. Native-Born Women's Average Covered Work Years to Selected Ages by Self-Reported Race and 
SSI/DI Experience, 1935–1970 Cohorts 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/Master Beneficiary File/Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
Note: DI/SSI series also excludes those in long-term uncovered employment. Sample is restricted to those with SER match who 
survive to selected age. 
 
Figure 14. 
Native-Born Men's Average Covered Work Experience at Selected Ages by Self-Reported Race and DI/SSI 
Experience, 1935–1970 Cohorts 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/Master Beneficiary File/Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
Note: DI/SSI series also excludes those in long-term uncovered employment. Sample is restricted to those with SER match who 
survive to selected age.  
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American women have logged about two years of additional covered work at age 50, and this 
climbs to almost four years at age 60. (Small sample sizes are a potential concern here, as this 
last point includes relatively few cohorts). For men, the pattern reverses. Differences between 
blacks and non-blacks narrow when considering only those not receiving disability benefits, but 
remain between two and one quarter years at 50 and three and three-quarters years at age 60.27 
Regression Results 
Differences in work history, covered employment experience, and disability can be found along 
a whole range of variables, such as gender, education, race, and cohort. Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression analyses provide a way to summarize some of these relationships in a compact 
form. 
Table 3 shows the simple OLS regression coefficients from SIPP for education’s effects 
on covered work years through the selected ages, for women (the top panel) and men (the bottom 
panel). Control variables in the models include cohort (coded categorically), race and ethnicity 
(dummy variables for blacks and Hispanics, to capture labor market discrimination [Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004] and other factors), immigrant status and years of adulthood spent outside the  
                                                 
27 Mortality and health effects may play a significant role in this. At age 60, a white man can expect to live 2.7 years 
longer than an African-American man (20.9 years, compared to 18.2 years) (Mininio et al. 2007). The corresponding 
difference for women is narrower, but still sizable at 1.9 years (24.1 compared to 22.2). So if we had measured work 
years by the percentage of expected adulthood worked by age 60, the black-nonblack differential would decrease for 
men and increase for women. Analogous considerations could be made for the educational comparisons (given than 
the more educated live longer than the less educated) and the gender comparisons (because women live longer than 
men). This raises the issue of how Social Security’s annuitization affects its redistribution (and how alternative 
approaches might account for differential mortality in different ways). These are interesting questions for further 
research, but beyond the scope of the current paper, which assumes that under the proposals OASDI would retain 
the same basic annuitization structure. 
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Table 3. OLS Regression Coefficients for Education Effects on Covered Work Years to Various Ages, with 
and without Controls for Disability Benefit Receipt and Duration 
 
WOMEN 
 
Age  62 60 55 50 
Birth Cohorts 1935-1942 1935-1944 1935-1948 1935-1954 
DI/SSI Control? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
         
<HS diploma -
4.18*** 
-
5.46*** 
-
4.07*** 
-
5.26*** 
-
4.11*** 
-
5.06*** 
-
3.55*** 
-
4.41*** 
High school  Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Some college 2.16*** 2.39*** 2.11*** 2.27*** 2.03*** 2.24***  1.88*** 2.02*** 
College grad  0.79        1.31 1.04  1.47*  0.99* 1.42***  1.41*** 1.80*** 
Post-college 4.31*** 4.94*** 3.43*** 4.00*** 3.34*** 3.94*** 2.93** 3.48*** 
         
Adj. R2 0.2448 0.2063 0.2512 0.2128 0.2888 0.2518 0.3187 0.2824 
N 2,807 3,667 6,467 9,694 
 
MEN 
 
Age  62 60 55 50 
Birth Cohorts 1935-1942 1935-1944 1935-1948 1935-1954 
DI/SSI Control? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
         
<HS diploma -
1.80***  
-
3.59*** 
-
2.32*** 
-
3.89*** 
-
2.22*** 
-
3.63*** 
-
1.77***  
-
2.97*** 
High school  Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Some college  0.05 0.26  0.00 0.14  0.28  0.50*  0.34*  0.55** 
College grad -0.49  0.39 -0.53 0.03 -0.25  0.28 -0.02  0.46* 
Post-college -0.10 0.72 -0.31 0.34 -0.86** -0.25 -
0.84*** 
-0.25 
         
Adj. R2 0.5664 0.4577 0.5730 0.4699 0.5781 0.4941 0.5603 0.4792 
N 2,509 3,374 5,894 8,836 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/ Master Beneficiary File/ Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
Notes: An earnings year is defined as one with at least 4 covered quarters of earnings. “Yes” column includes controls for both 
incidence and duration of DI and/or SSI. Other controls include cohort, ethnicity (Hispanic/Not Hispanic), immigrant status and 
duration in U.S. (for immigrants), years of uncovered employment (since 1981, plus 1981 status), race (black/non-black), and 
number of children. Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to selected age.  
***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05 
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U.S. (for immigrants), years of non-covered work experience (after 1981, plus an indicator for 
baseline non-coverage status in 1981), and number of children (coded as dummy variables to 
allow for non-linearities).28 Separate models add a control for duration of DI/SSI receipt. In all 
models, we can interpret the coefficients as the number of additional years of employment for the 
members of the education group (relative to the reference group of high school graduates, up to 
the selected age, assuming survival), all else equal.  
For women, those with less than a high school education work less than other education 
groups in the SIPP after taking into account the control factors. The shortfall ranges from three 
and one half years at age 50 (after considering time on DI/SSI) to five and one half years at 62 
(not considering DI/SSI), relative to high school graduates (the reference category and largest 
group). Incorporating DI/SSI tends to reduce this education effect for the least educated women 
by about one year.29 All else equal, those who attended graduate school work the most (between 
three and five years more than the high school graduates), followed by those with some college 
(but not a college degree), who work about two years more. At the older ages, covered work 
years for women who are college and high school graduates do not differ significantly from one 
another.  
                                                 
28 The rationale for including the number of children is to allow us to think about service years in a broader way by 
incorporating time out of the labor force to care for children. Regression estimates that exclude variables about 
children are available upon request (for males, the signs on the coefficients for children are typically positive). We 
do not include marital status or marital history variables in these regressions, because marriage should not affect the 
ability to provide service years to the same extent that children do. We also do not consider many other variables 
(such as defined benefit pension coverage that may provide strong incentives to leave the labor force relatively 
early). Additional regressions include an indicator for health status (specifically fair or poor health at the last SIPP 
interview) in addition to the DI/SSI controls, though this is not measured well, so we do not present the results here. 
29 Integrating health status (as described in note 28) further reduces the effect of education for those who did not 
complete high school, though the effect remains large and significant for men and women. The health effect itself is 
sizable (again for both men and women), suggesting potential importance for work histories of health problems that 
limit work that are not covered under DI or SSI. 
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For men, the many negative coefficients indicate that high school graduates (the 
reference category) often work more than other educational groups in the analyses once we 
control for other factors. At all ages, those with less than a high school education work the least, 
logging an average of one and three-quarters to three and three-quarters years fewer than high 
school graduates, all else equal. The effect of disability benefit receipt for less educated men 
amounts to about 1.5 years. At the younger ages (50 and 55), the most educated (those with more 
than college) have also worked significantly less than the high school graduates, but this effect 
dissipates with age, suggesting some “catching up.”  
These analyses could be masking the increasing selectivity of the less than high school 
group over time and other rapid changes in the educational distribution of the population (the 
cohort control indicator will pick up intercept shifts, but not shifts in education’s effects). We 
therefore estimate models where we interact the less-than-high-school-education indicator with 
cohort indicators (Table 4). (The control variables remain the same as in the previous analyses.) 
We see that the effect of having low education, while persistently negative across all cohorts for 
both men and women even when we account for DI, appears to increase across the successive 
cohorts, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficients for the interaction terms for 
later cohorts. That is, long careers among the relatively less educated appear to be increasingly 
less common.  
To summarize, the regression analyses indicate that among near retirees, men with at 
least a high school education tend to have relatively similar, strong covered work histories. 
While their work histories do not always differ statistically from those for male college 
graduates, male high school graduates outwork men with graduate or professional school  
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Table 4. OLS Regression Coefficients for Education Effects on Covered Work Years to Various Ages, 
Interacting Education Less than High School with Cohort, with Controls for Disability Receipt and Duration 
 
WOMEN 
 
Age   60 55 50 
Birth Cohorts  1935-1944 1935-1948 1935-1954 
     
<HS (any cohort)  -3.96*** -3.03*** -1.76***  
<HS * 1940s cohort  -0.22 -1.70*** -1.98*** 
<HS * 1950s cohort  n/a n/a -3.46*** 
High school   Ref Ref Ref 
Some college  2.10*** 2.01***  1.85*** 
College grad  1.04 0.98*  1.38*** 
Post-college  3.43** 3.33*** 2.91*** 
     
Adj. R2  0.2511 0.2894 0.3207 
N  3,667 6,467 9,694 
 
MEN 
 
Age   60 55 50 
Birth Cohorts  1935-1944 1935-1948 1935-1954 
     
<HS (any cohort)   -1.96*** -1.46*** -0.75*  
<HS * 1940s cohort  -0.72 -1.15* -1.08* 
<HS * 1950s cohort  n/a n/a -1.93*** 
High school   Ref Ref Ref 
Some college  0.00 0.26 0.33* 
College grad  -0.53 -0.25 -0.03 
 
Post-college  -0.31 -0.87** -0.84*** 
     
Adj. R2  0.5731 0.5785 0.5610 
N  3,374 5,894 8,836 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/ Master Beneficiary File/ Supplemental Security Record and Numident though 2004. 
Notes: An earnings year is defined as one with at least 4 covered quarters of earnings. Model includes controls for both 
incidence and duration of DI to the select ages. Other controls include cohort, ethnicity (Hispanic/Not Hispanic), immigrant 
status and duration in U.S. (for immigrants), years of uncovered employment (since 1981, plus 1981 status), race (black/non-
black), and number of children. Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to selected age.  
n/a= not applicable 
***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05 
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education until their early 60s, when the more educated appear likely to close the small gap. The 
results suggest that this same pattern will not persist to the same degree in future cohorts. The 
decline in work years among the least educated men raises special concerns, although these 
concerns might be as much directed at helping them in their work years as in their retirement 
years. The least educated women have also worked the least. Those with post- graduate 
education have worked the most, followed by those with some college.  
Because the Social Security earnings records do not have complete information prior to 
1951, we have focused on cohorts who are just reaching the early eligibility age and normal 
retirement age in 2004, the last year for which we have data. Considering differences in covered 
work by education at later ages can help determine to what extent those with higher education 
levels might “pull ahead” of their less educated counterparts (see, for example, Haider and 
Loughran 2001). When we tabulate the SIPP data, we find that gaps in covered work by 
education level increase at the later ages beyond those that we have shown (Table 5). For 
example, those who did not complete high school are the least likely to be working for both men 
and women at each age between 65 and 68. These findings suggest that the more educated 
workers will likely either close the gap with other workers (in the case of men) or pull further 
ahead where they already lead in covered work years (in the case of women). 
Sensitivity Analyses 
The preceding analyses defined a work year as one in which an individual had at least four 
covered quarters of earnings. One could of course define an earnings year many other ways. We 
consider two alternative ways of defining an earnings year--a year with any earnings and a year 
with earnings representing at least half-time, half-year work at the minimum wage (520 hours.  
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Table 5. Fraction with Any Covered Work Earnings at Older Ages, 2004  
 
WOMEN 
 
Age  68 67 66 65 
     
<HS diploma 0.068 0.124 0.227 0.222 
High school  0.318 0.280 0.304 0.392 
Some college 0.166 0.283 0.374 0.372 
College grad 0.179 0.367 0.387 0.414 
Post-college 0.368 0.500 0.277 0.640 
     
MEN 
 
Age  68 67 66 65 
     
<HS diploma 0.194 0.126 0.327 0.383 
High school  0.392 0.431 0.361 0.357 
Some college 0.374 0.340 0.453 0.473 
College grad 0.413 0.425 0.556 0.680 
Post-college 0.471 0.361 0.467 0.653 
     
     
N 567 558 636 703 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records and Numident though 2004. 
Note: Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to selected age. Estimates are weighted to account for SIPP’s 
oversampling of households in areas with high poverty concentrations. 
 
per year, equivalent to 20 hours per week for 26 weeks). These alternative thresholds are relevant 
for Social Security policy, as some have suggested defining a work year as a multiple of the 
minimum wage to measure substantial commitment to the labor force. Appendix Figure A.1 
illustrates how these measures have varied over time 
The results are relatively similar in qualitative terms when we move from the four- 
covered-quarters concept to any earnings or a minimum-wage based definition (Table 6).30 In 
nearly all cases, the direction of the effect on work years does not differ, but the size does.31   
                                                 
30 Results from all of the analyses (both descriptive and regression) with each of these alternative measures (and an 
additional measure of at least one quarter of OASDI coverage) of work years are available upon request.  
31 For example, the effect of graduate school, which is statistically significant and negative with a minimum wage 
threshold declines and is no longer statistically significant with thresholds of either zero or four covered quarters. 
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Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis of Work Years to Age 60 (1935–1944 Cohorts): SIPP Education Coefficients 
under Different Definitions, with Controls for Disability Participation 
 
 OLS Regression Coefficients 
 Men Women 
 Any earnings At least 4 
CQ 
Minimum 
wage 
Any earnings At least 4 
CQ 
Minimum 
wage 
       
Intercept 37.717*** 36.611*** 35.747*** 29.840*** 28.091*** 26.711*** 
       
<High school -2.053*** -2.316*** -2.580*** -3.744***   -4.065*** -3.978***  
Some college  0.105 
 
 0.002 
 
-0.035  2.123*** 
  
 2.106*** 
  
 2.064*** 
 
College 
graduate 
-0.394 
 
-0.526 
 
-0.935* 
 
 1.131 
  
 1.043 
  
 0.910  
  
Graduate 
school 
-0.260 -0.308 -0.950*  3.598***  3.430***  3.380*** 
       
N 3,374 3,667 
Adj. R2  0.5978  0.5730  0.5571  0.2646  0.2512  0.2497 
       
 
***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05  
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation matched to Summary Earnings 
Records/Detailed Earnings Records/Numident/Master Beneficiary File/ Supplemental Security Record though 2004. 
Notes: Reference category is high school only or GED. Control for DI/SSI includes both presence and duration. Other control 
variables include number of children, race/ethnicity, cohort, immigrant status and duration in U.S. (for immigrants), years of 
uncovered employment (since 1981, plus 1981 status). Sample is restricted to those with SER match who survive to age 60. 
CQ=covered quarter. 
 
 
 
Importantly, the intercepts in the models appear to differ by about two years for men 
between the least restrictive and most restrictive service-year definitions and by closer to three 
years for women. It is not surprising that the patterns shift more for women than for men, given 
their lower earnings (meaning that their earnings are more likely to be close to any minimum 
threshold). Thus, benefit eligibility and levels could change quite markedly with different 
earnings thresholds and definitions of a service year.  
Policy Implications  
 These results show that basing retirement age on years of service would not protect many of 
those with less than a high school education from negative effects of an increase in the 
retirement age. Those with less than a high school education have the shortest work histories, 
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even when we take disability program participation into account. For men with a high school 
education, years of work do not differ greatly from those with a college education, especially at 
older ages. For women, those with more than a high school education outwork those with just 
the high school diploma. If the goal is to target low-wage workers more broadly, then basing 
retirement age on a service-years formula, barring other adjustments, could reduce the relative 
benefits of women who on average have both fewer years of service and lower incomes than 
men. 
 Heterogeneity is significant, however, so analysts need to look beyond average effects. 
The majority of men without a high school diploma, for example, still work many years under 
Social Security definitions, so could receive some relief under a variety of benefit formula 
adjustments (for example, bonuses for work years above a threshold). 
Increasing computation years might improve work incentives and such inequities as 
higher benefits for those with 30 years of service at $40,000 than 40 years at $30,000.  By itself, 
it is hard to say what this does for the relative benefits of women, who work fewer years on 
average but also benefit more from spousal and survivor benefits. Suffice it to say that other 
adjustments, such as a minimum benefit or change in the benefit formula, could be used as an 
offset to a computation years change to achieve some progressivity goal. 
This study does suggest that caregiver credits would increase benefit levels more for 
women than men—though full examination of this issue requires an investigation of spousal and 
survivor benefits. But, as in the prior cases, once one looks at distributions rather than averages 
caregiver credits can seem less well targeted. Clear equity issues arise since many women and 
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men who raise children also work outside the home. And the fraction performing both roles is 
increasing. 
The descriptive results on lifetime earnings levels and work years repeat what prior 
research has shown with respect to minimum benefits: design really matters. Basing minimum 
benefits on substantial service-year requirements may help low-wage males regardless of 
education, but for women in and out of the work force, other changes—for example counting 
fewer years in the basic formula to qualify for a minimum or perhaps adding some minimum 
number of years of work for childrearing (e.g., five years) in determining eligibility for a 
minimum--may be required if the primary goal is progressivity.  
All of these potential policy changes interact with spousal and survivor benefits, so 
further analysis is required. But we are cautioned about basing various OASDI eligibility criteria 
solely on high service year requirements. 
Conclusions 
Our analyses underscore four main points: First, even if one excludes those who receive 
disability benefits, years of work vary significantly among and within different subgroups of the 
population. For both men and women, those who did not complete high school work fewer years 
on average. For men, high school graduates reach target years of service earlier than those who 
went beyond college, but the gap with the college educated is relatively modest (and at later ages 
may not differ from zero). For women, employment history clearly rises with education, 
especially for those who attended graduate school and, to a lesser extent, those with some 
college. 
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Second, these patterns are changing fairly rapidly across cohorts, so that what might be 
good policy for today’s near retirees may be less appropriate for future retirees.  
A third finding is troubling: the relatively low employment rates of less-educated people 
in the more recent cohorts. This suggests the need for new or different types of initiatives among 
the most disadvantaged—attacking the problem at earlier ages rather than dealing with its 
consequences at later ages.  
Finally, definitions of a work year—and other specifics of how a reform is 
parameterized—matter a good deal in designing policies. Simply basing retirement age on years 
of service, for instance, is likely to meet goals of neither progressivity nor fairness. Even policy 
options that might work well for a group on average may not work well for many in that group 
who are not average. This implies that a policy option often needs to be considered as part of a 
larger package of changes, which can offer greater opportunity to build in offsetting adjustments 
in order better to reconcile competing objectives.  
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Appendix 
Information on Match Rates and Match Differentials and Explanations of 
Computations, Including Methods for Imputing Missing Data 
  
The age to which one counts when tabulating career or lifetime histories influences the 
results, given important differences in who works at older ages (see, for example, the findings in 
Table 5) and differential mortality--the tendency for lower income and less educated workers 
tend to die more rapidly (see, for example, Waldron 2007). The further into the career that we 
look, the more important differential mortality becomes, especially for men. Because of this, we 
show estimates at a range of ages and highlight analyses to ages where the mortality effects are 
relatively modest (e.g., ages 60 and under). Receipt of Social Security retired worker benefits 
typically requires survival to age 62. 
Elaborating further on this survival issue, we use Numident to screen SIPP sample 
members for post-interview mortality in all age-specific measures (e.g., covered work years to 
age 60).32 It is important to bear in mind that individuals in different analyses have survived to 
different points because of the way that we combine core interview data with follow-up 
information (though 2004) from the administrative records. For example, all individuals in all of 
our analyses have survived to 1996, so those in the core 1935-1947 cohorts have survived to at 
least ages 49 to 61. But the later cohorts are not as select, and include individuals who died (or 
will die) prior to age 49, making direct comparisons across the cohorts challenging. 
Because the SIPP is a longitudinal survey, we could conduct these analyses on either a 
person or a person-year level. We opt for the person level to prevent double counting (and 
  
47 The Retirement Policy Program 
confounding with the non-random nature of mortality and survey attrition), using the latest and 
“best” observation with complete data (from among the 1996 through 2000 survey responses) for 
t he key self-reported characteristics, like education, child bearing history, etc.33 Using later 
(post-1996) responses is more important for the younger people, who are less likely to have 
completed childbearing and/or education in the earlier SIPP waves. When determining the best 
observation, we screen for mortality. To mitigate the effects of the non-random survey attrition, 
we retain individuals with just one SIPP observation.  
Certain information, most notably data on number of children and nativity, come from 
SIPP topical modules (most notably wave two) rather than the “core” survey. Data are thus 
missing for those who attrit between baseline and the second round of SIPP interviews. In such 
cases, we use wave one data on current family size where available to fill in the latter variable, 
but this will not be the best possible reflection of lifetime experience having children. 
Match rates for the administrative records are an important issue because these analyses 
rely so heavily on administrative data. SIPP respondents were linked to administrative records at 
high rates--around 86 percent for cohorts we examine in the 1996 SIPP—relative to alternatives 
(like the HRS). Of course, the match rate itself is only a part of the concern: Representativeness 
of the match is vitally important. Regression analyses suggest that non-matched records do differ 
from matched records along a few key dimensions, which underscores the need for cautious 
interpretation.  
                                                                                                                                                             
32 The SIPP linkage to the Numident file’s mortality data allows us to do this through 2003, seven years after the 
original SIPP interviews. 
33 Our sample does not include immigrants who came to the U.S. after the SIPP panel, but this is of only minor 
significance given that our analyses focus on experiences of the native born and control for length of residence in the 
U.S. to the extent possible. 
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Appendix Figure A.1. 
Comparison of Alternative Wage-Adjusted Work Years Thresholds, 1951–2005 
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